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and the Concept of
"Quasi-Public" Property
Recent developments granting labor interests access to
management property for union organizational pur-
poses raise doubts as to the continuing validity of tra-
ditional notions concerning property rights. In the con-
text of labor relations, as well as in other situations such
as the civil rights disputes so common to the contempo-
rary scene, the courts and other decision making bodies
are determining that the more the public or some portion
thereof are invited to use property, the more the owner's
traditional property rights become limited by the con-
stitutional and statutory rights of the individuals granted
such use. This article traces the development of union
organizational rights involving property owned by quasi-
public enterprises and considers the relevant constitu-
tional rights, the statutory rights granted under the
NLRA, and the body of case law which has developed
from these sources. In considering such labor activities
as solicitation, distribution, picketing, and public hand-
billing, the author analyzes distinctions between activi-
ties carried on by employee or nonemployee organizers,
and appeals aimed at employees or at the general public.
Likewise, he examines such elements as the relative
necessity of access to particular types of property in
specific factual settings, the relative necessity of particu-
lar types of communications in specific fact situations,
discrimination on the part of employers in allowing the
use of their property, and the reasonable demands of
management to prevent interference with normal busi-
ness operations. Further, the author gives consideration
to the jurisdictional disputes between the NLRB and
the various state courts. The author concludes that the
traditional concepts of property rights which once suf-
fced to defend against intrusions by portions of the
public can no longer remain intact. Some balancing of
interests must be made in order to best guarantee all
the rights of all the parties involved.
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Some of the most subtle winds of change today in the law of
labor-management relations relate to union organizational tech-
nique and what may be, through little fault of the unions, a
diminished respect in this context for the claims of property own-
ership. Congress, of course, has somewhat hampered the exercise
of organizational picketing rights through enactment of the
Landrum-Griffin amendments" and, perhaps more importantly,
would seem to have enlarged the public's antagonism toward
conduct which seeks to enlist the wage earner as a union member
in the bargaining unit and, at the same time, to have studiously
avoided the difficult task of employee persuasion. An attempt to
avoid criticism from the public and diminishing returns from other
methods may impel organizers to rely more heavily than in the
past on winning the wage earner's loyalties through the distribu-
tion of literature and influencing employee free choice through
solicitation of membership; the desirable expression of this choice
*Member of the Michigan Bar. The viewpoints expressed in this article do
not necessarily represent those of the NLRB or any of its members.
1. E.g., Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 8(b)(7)(C), added
by § 704(c), 78 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (Supp. V, 1964):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents:
i(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause
to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or re-
quiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization
as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the em-
ployees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as
their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organiza-
tion is currently certified as the representative of such employer:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
under Section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to
exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Pro-
vided, that when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forth-
with, without regard to the provisions of Section 9(c)(1) or the absence
of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organiza-
tion, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate
and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing
in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing
or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public
(including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of,
or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such
picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in
the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any
goods or not to perform services.
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will be majority rule as translated by an NLRB election?
All of this in turn will exercise a considerable, though not
exclusive, impetus towards judicial reexamination of some of our
more traditional notions regarding property ownership. The most
dramatic collision between union organizational technique and
management property rights takes place where management in-
vites the public onto its property to do business. The list of such
types of establishments is potentially long. Many of them, as
will be seen below, are eliminated or severely limited in their
application to this problem by the analysis employed.
Union solicitation and distribution comprise the primary ob-
ject of attention in this discussion. While this emphasis should
not distract us from other operations which will pose the conflicts
similarly (i.e., handbilling and picketing aimed at the public),'
union activity directed at the workers, such as solicitation and
distribution and perhaps public handbilling, should on most
counts make the union's case an easier one. The first reason for
this distinction is that picketing, the patrolling of an area with
placard in hand, is something more than free speech. It exerts
a more volatile influence on certain audiences;4 and the Supreme
Court has so held in language less qualified than that used here5
Thus the Court's recent decision protecting picketing in NLRB v.
Fruit Packers Local 760,6 while it strikes an important blow in
defense of picketing and less disruptive forms of union organizing
discussed herein as free speech, can be rationalized in terms of
the remote distance of its secondary situs from the primary em-
ployer's plant where greater economic havoc might ensue as a
result of the same conduct. The second reason for a distinction
based on whether union activities are aimed at employees or at
the public is the genuine need to get as near as possible to the
employee's place of work; the comparative value here is a better
2. See NLRA § 9, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1964).
3. But see AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), wherein the Court noted
that the "stranger" picketing unlawfully enjoined in that case was aimed at
employees. Characterization of this kind of union conduct cannot be done in
an "either/or" manner.
4. See Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VANm. L. REv. 574,
591-602 (1951).
5. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 <1950); of. Mr. Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion in Bakery Drivers Local v. Wobl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942).
The Court has reaffirmed this view most recently in Cox v. Louisiana, 85 Sup.
Ct. 453, 464-65 (1965). Compare Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
6. 377 US. 58 (1964).
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likelihood that the dispute remains identifiable in terms of the
particular employer and that the campaign directly aims at those
who must make the decision. A third factor argues in both direc-
tions; this involves customer annoyance and a consequent loss of
sales for management. Public handbilling would be the most
disruptive approach here. If the workers have variegated work
schedules - which is very likely to be the case in some of the
enterprises to be discussed - entanglement with customer mobil-
ity may be present. However, picketing, advertisement that it is,
would still seem to prove the most bothersome.
On the other hand union organization, for a number of rea-
sons, may not be entitled to share any of the inroads made re-
cently on quasi-public property by the victims of racial discrim-
ination. But such a distinction will be difficult to reason. In both
Thomas v. Collind and Staub v. City of Baxley,' the Court has
held that union solicitation rights, albeit within certain limita-
tions,9 are protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. The
Court has emphasized the broad sweep of protection accorded
diverse petitioners in NAACP v. Alabama:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group asso-
ciation, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.
... It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "Iib-
erty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which embraces freedom of speech.... Of course, it is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to
the closest scrutiny.10
But the crucial hurdle here is private property, for it is the
7. 823 U.S. 516 (1945); of. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
8. 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
9. In Thomas the Court stated the following:
Once the Speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct which
amounts to more than the right of free discussion comprehends, as
when he undertakes the collection of funds or securing subscriptions,
he enters a realm where a reasonable registration or identification re-
quirement may be imposed. In that context such solicitation would be
quite different from the solicitation involved here....
32S U.S. at 540. In Staub the Court stated that the solicitation right in
question consisted solely of speaking to employees in their homes. The Court
said, "For that reason we are not confronted with any question concerning
the right of the city to regulate the pursuit of an occupation... ." 355 U.S.
at 322 n.5 (citing Thomas v. Collins).
10. 857 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). (Emphasis added and citations omitted.)
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location of employer property that has impelled the unions to
operate thereon. Though subject to reasonable use in other areas
of the law, curiously the concept of property rights has become
a rallying cry in the field of labor law. The traditional notion
would seem to be that the concept suffices as an absolute defense
against those who would engage in union activity. That notion -
like so many others held as doctrine by past generations - may
well be under increasing attack.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR UNION
ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHTS ON
MANAGEMENT PROPERTY
More than 20 years ago the National Labor Relations Board
set forth its ground rules to deal with the rights of employees to
conduct self-organization activities on company property pur-
suant to Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.1' In
Peyton Packing Co.' the Board established these governing prin-
ciples of law:
The Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from making and
enforcing reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on com-
pany time. Working time is for work. It is therefore within the province
of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union
solicitation during working hours. Such a rule must be presumed to be
valid in the absence of evidence that it was adopted for a discriminatory
purpose. It is no less true that time outside working hours, whether
before or after work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's
time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint, although the
employee is on company property. It is therefore not within the
province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting
union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although
on company property. Such a rule must be presumed to be an un-
reasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory
in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule
necessary in order to maintain production or discipline.' 3
11. As amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
12. 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 823 U.S. 780 (1944).
13. Id. at 848-44.
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In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB"' the Supreme Court
followed this approach. In that case the Court was presented
with the question of whether the rights of employees to pass out
union "authorization" cards in the plant during nonworking time,
to pass out union literature in the parking lot, and to wear union
insignia at any time on company property, were protected under
section 7 of the act. Moreover, the Court was asked to uphold
the Board's presumption, as postulated in Peyton Packing, that
employer prohibition of such activity was violative of section
8(a)(1)" without the discriminatory motive that this provision
normally requires for the finding of an unfair labor practice. Mr.
Justice Reed, writing for the Court, held this to be protected
activity and ratified the Board's principle that impingement of
such rights could be rationalized only by an employer's legitimate
business interest in production and discipline. Normally the de-
fense was to be limited to working time. But the special considera-
tions of some enterprises (retail department stores was to become
a noted one)'6 were permitted.
Subsequently, however, the Republic rationale was severely
limited. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 17 the Court
made it clear that nonemployee union organizers stood on
an entirely different footing from the employees involved in the
former case. In Babcock the Court kept intact the application
of Republic to employee rights'8 but restricted the rights of non-
employees to distribute literature to employees on company park-
ing lots. Mr. Justice Reed, delivering the Court's opinion once
again, stated:
It is our judgment ... that an employer may validly post his property
against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts
by the union through other available channels of communication will
enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's
notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing
other distribution.' 9
14. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
15. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1958): "(a) It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer: 1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 . . . ."
16. Meier & Frank Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1950); Goldblatt Bros., 77
N.L.R.B. 1262 (1948); J. L. Hudson Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1403 (1946); May
Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), af'd, 154 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1946);
see Meier & Frank Co., supra at 1021 (dissenting opinion of Members Houston
and Styles). Compare NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759,
762-64 (5th Cir. 1960); Maxam Buffalo, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1962);
Marshall Field & Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 1 (1941).
17. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
18. Id. at 113.
19. Id. at 112.
510
"QUASI-PUBLIC" PROPERTY
Thus two elements are relevant to the rights of nonemployees: 1)
the existence of alternate channels of communication, and 2) the
employer's discriminatory grant of permission to others. Whether
the Court meant such "other distribution" to include manage-
ment's own activity has never been entirely clear. This area and
other important ones were further confused by the Court's next
decision.
In NLRB v. United Steelworkers-o the issue concerned whether
the NLRA qualified in any way the right of an employer to en-
gage in certain types of anti-union solicitation during working
hours. The same activities, if engaged in by the employees, would
have violated an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule and sub-
jected the employees to possible discharge. The Court protested
against the breadth of the question posed in the terms "regard-
less of the way in which the particular controversy arose."- To
answer the case in this manner, the Court said, would show
"indifference" to the Board's responsibility to observe diverse
circumstances. The record of neither case indicated "that the
employees, or the union on their behalf, requested the employer,
himself engaging in anti-union solicitation, to make an exception
to the rule for pro-union solicitation."" The Court noted the
"clear anti-union bias of both employers," but refused to assume
that such a request would be rejected "although it might well
have been open to the Board to conclude as a matter of industrial
experience"23 that a request was futile. Thus, Steelworkers held
that the failure by employees, as well as nonemployee organizers,
to request permission could prove fatal to an unfair labor practice
finding.
Secondly, the Court rebuked the Board for not finding whether
the rule had "truly diminished the ability of the labor organiza-
tions involved to carry their messages to the employees."2 4 Citing
the Babcock rule of alternate communications as "highly rele-
vant," the majority stated:
[T]he Taft-Hartley Act [NLRA] does not command that labor organiza-
tions as a matter of abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected
in the use of every possible means of reaching the minds of individual
workers, nor that they are entitled to use a medium of communication
simply because the employer is using it.2
20. 357 U.S. 357 (1958). Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the majority;
Mr. Chief Justice Warren dissented in part; Justices Black and Douglas
dissented.
21. Id. at 362.
22. Id. at 363.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 864.
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Thus, the Court said that mechanical answers would not avail,
since where plant location, facilities, and other resources made
union opportunities "at least as great as the employer's ability
to promote the legally authorized expression of his anti-union
views, there is no basis for invalidating these 'otherwise valid'
rules."2 6 The Court was careful to state that, in proper circum-
stances, an employer could commit an unfair labor practice by
violating his own rule but that "there must be some basis, in the
actualities of industrial relations, for such a finding."2 7
One immediate consequence of the Court's unconcealed hos-
tility to per se findings of unfair labor practices by the NLRB
in support of nonemployee organizers is that in order to require
the employer to give the union an opportunity to answer, on
plant property, an anti-union captive audience speech, an im-
balance in communications must be demonstrated by the union.
In May Dep't Stores Co." the Board held, in the face of Bab-
cock and Steelworkers, that nonemployee organizers were en-
titled to access to company property in department stores to
answer a captive audience address. The Board reasoned that the
broad no-solicitation rule, to which department stores are entitled
because of that business' peculiarities,2 9 created the "imbalance"
requisite to the Babcock-Steelworkers rationale. Insofar as unfair
labor cases are concerned," it would seem that the Board is fore-
closed by Steelworkers from extending the May doctrine to the
more normal establishment where no-solicitation rules cannot be
promulgated during nonworking time. What the May case con-
tributes to this discussion is, however, the great importance of
contact between nonemployee organizers and employees. May




28. 186 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir.
1963); of. NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 Fd 78 (6th Cir. 1954); NLRB
v. American Tube Bending Co., 205 F.ad 45 (2d Cir. 1953); Montgomery
Ward & Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964), enforced as modified, 339 F.2d 889 (6th
Cir. 1965); Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 NL.R.B. 608 (1951), enforced as modified,
197 Fd 640 (2d Cir. 1952).
29. See note 16 supra.
S0. The Board is not necessarily precluded from extending the May doc-
trine in representation cases. See NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc.,
224 Fd 649 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955); of. Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962); Metropolitan Auto Parts Inc., lo N.L.R.B.
1634, 1638 (1953) (concurring opinion of Chairman Herzog).
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The normal effectiveness of such channels stems not alone from the
ability of a union to make contact with employees, away from their
place of work, but also from the availability of normal opportunities to
employees who have been contacted to discuss the matter with fellow
employees at their place of work. The place of work is the one place
where all employees involved are sure to be together. Thus it is the one
place where they can all discuss with each other the advantages and
disadvantages of organization, and lend each other support and encour-
agement. Such full discussion lies at the very heart of the organizational
rights guaranteed by the Act, and is not to be restricted, except as the
exigencies of production, discipline, and order demand. It is only where
opportunities for such discussion are available, limited, of course, by
the need to maintain production, order, and discipline, that the elec-
tion procedures established in the Act can be expected to product
[sic] the peaceful resolution of representation questions on the basis
of a free and informed choice. Where such discussion is not allowed,
the normal channels of communication become clogged and lose their
effectiveness. In such circumstances, the balance in "opportunities for
organizational communication" is destroyed by an employer's utiliza-
tion of working time and place for its antiunion campaign.3'
Thus the first basic principle in the resolution of this type of
labor-management conflict is that employee contact with organ-
izers is necessary for the purpose of discussion and free choice.
A second basic principle recognizes the importance of the em-
ployee's work place as the focal point in the organizational struggle
because of the inherent difficulties in the use of other possible
meeting places. Addresses and telephone numbers are difficult to
obtain. Employee homes are relevant only to meeting with a few
key supporters at an early stage of the campaign. In many situa-
tions the distance of employee homes from a union hall - assum-
ing one is available - makes this an undesirable meeting place.
As the Board has recently said in a decision upholding employee
rights to solicit on company property:
Their place of work is the one location where employees are
brought together on a daily basis. It is the one place where they
clearly share common interests and where they traditionally seek to
persuade fellow workers in matters affecting their union organizational
life and other matters related to their status as employees.3 2
Thus the freedom of association enunciated in NAACP v. Ala-
bama"3 is made pertinent to private property by May. The propo-
sition that these statutory rights are inextricably linked with
31. 136 NL.R.B. at 802.
82. Gale Prods., 142 NL.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963), enforcement denied, 337
F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
33. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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the protection of the Constitution has received approval by the
Second Circuit in NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp."
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF RIGHTS TO
QUASI-PUBLIC PROPERTY
The significance of private property to which the public has
access has been the subject of much constitutional debate. In
Marsh v. Alabama"5 the Supreme Court held that the right to
distribute religious literature in the privately owned business or
"regular shopping center" of a company town was constitutionally
protected and, under such circumstances, superior to the prop-
erty rights involved. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
characterized the free speech involved in such literature as in a
"preferred position" relative to the property owner. Citing Re-
public, the Court said that the more an owner, "for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and consti-
tutional rights of those who use it."" Through this analysis the
presence of the elusive "state action," upon which the protection
of the fourteenth amendment is dependent, was found.
The Court further categorized bridges, ferries and turnpikes
as operations which have "essentially a public function" and are
thus subject to state regulation. Refusing to accord citizens in a
company town an inferior constitutional status because of legal
title, the Court held that municipal or corporate interests not-
withstanding, 7 the property in question was not sufficient to
restrict these "fundamental liberties." The fact that Marsh in-
volved a company town setting (which is referred to a number of
times by the Court) points up the lack of alternative communica-
tions so important to the Babcock case. However, this fact does
not seem to have been of primary importance. Indeed, Mr. Justice
Reed, the author of Babcock, dissented in Marsh because of
the apparent availability of nearby public property where the dis-
tribution could have been conducted safely."s At the same time
the highly significant concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter clearly contained more limited conclusions:
Title to property as defined by State law controls property relations;
it cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a
84. 824 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964).
85. 826 U.S. 501 (1946).
36. Id. at 506.
87. Id. at 507.
88. Id. at 513.
514 [Vol. 49:505
"QUASI-PUBLIC" PROPERTY
company town is a town as well as a congeries of property relations.
And similarly the technical distinctions on which a finding of "trespass"
so often depends are too tenuous to control decision regarding the scope
of the vital liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.3
Marsh is then the touchstone of departure for arguments support-
ing the exercise of labor union activity on property to which the
public has access - "quasi-public" property.
Shelley v. Kraemer,40 where the Court struck down state court
enforcement of restrictive covenants in housing, emphasizes an-
other element which was not spelled out in Marsh. Shelley holds
that, at least for the purposes of that case, judicial enforcement
can provide "state action" within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. Thus both the quasi-public nature of the property
in question and the state enforcement of a policy contrary to the
union position justify constitutional and statutory regulation.
However, no implication is intended that the Board and the courts
should, in non-quasi-public cases arising under the National Labor
Relations Act, emulate the obsequiousness to property rights
evidenced in Babcock and Steelworkers. On the contrary, those
cases should be distinguished away to the greatest extent pos-
sible. May is a good start in that direction. Moreover, state action
may well tip the balance of communication away from the union
in cases which indirectly involve public access property?1 But
the presence of quasi-public considerations strengthens the case
for free speech. Furthermore, the Board will be on firmer ground,
when departing from the Babcock-Steelworkers rationale, if their
decisions are consistent with constitutional opinions.
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Garner v. Louisi-
ana" accepts and indeed expands on the quasi-public rationale
put forward in Marsh. In Garner, "sit-ins," protesting the racially
discriminatory practices of certain retail store restaurants, were
convicted under a breach of the peace statute. A majority of the
Court set aside the conviction for lack of evidence. Mr. Justice
Douglas, however, characterized the restaurants as "public facili-
ties" where the "sit-ins" had a right to protest in an orderly
39. Id. at 511.
40. 834 U.S. 1 (1948).
41. See Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 2 LAn. REL. REP.
(58 L.R.R.M.) 1268 (Jan. 29, 1965), wherein the Board held that the
May doctrine was inapplicable to a department store with its no solicitation
rule applicable to nonworking time only. Here, however, the locality pro-
hibited the distribution of literature on public streets and thus precluded
union activity at store entrances.
42. 868 U.S. 157, 176 (1961).
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fashion. His concurring opinion analogizes the restaurant to those
industries "affected with a public interest" 8 and theorizes that
"a license to establish a restaurant is a license to establish a public
facility and necessarily imports, in law, equality of use for all
members of the public." 4
Subsequently in Bell v. Maryland," where a majority of the
Court remanded the conviction of sit-ins because Maryland had
passed a public accommodations statute after the prosecutions
took place, Mr. Justice Douglas, now joined by Mr. Justice
Goldberg in relevant part, reiterated his position taken in Garner:
The property involved is not, however, a man's home or his yard
or even his fields. Private property is involved, but it is property that
is serving the public. As my Brother Goldberg says, it is a "civil" right,
not a "social" right, with which we deal . . .. The problem with which
we deal has no relation to opening or closing the door of one's home.
The home of course is the essence of privacy, in no way dedicated to
public use, in no way extending an invitation to the public. Some busi-
nesses, like the classical country store where the owner lives overhead
or in the rear, make the store an extension, so to speak, of the home.
But such is not this case. The facts of these sit-in cases have little
resemblance to any institution of property which we customarily asso-
ciate with privacy. 6
In Bell, Justice Douglas has relied heavily on important mod-
ern developments involving separation of ownership and control
in the corporation. The former's remoteness from the latter is
well documented.4 7 The opinion highlights the present day ob-
stacles to the more fundamentalist analysis of property rights
possible when ownership and control were one:
It is said that ownership of property carries the right to use it in
association with such people as the owner chooses. The corporate own-
ers in these cases - the stockholders - are unidentified members of the
public at large, who probably never saw these petitioners, who may
never have frequented these restaurants. What personal rights of theirs
would be vindicated by affirmance? ... Who, in this situation, is the
corporation?48
43. Id. at 183.
44. Id. at 184.
45. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 85 Sup. Ct. 453 (1965);
Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963).
46. Id. at 252-53.
47. Justice Douglas cites the classic BER & MEANS, THE MODERN CoR-
PORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). See more recently BERLE, THE 20r
CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954); CRosLAND, THE FuTuRE or SociAL-
ism (1956); MEANs, TaE CoRPoRATE REvOLUTIoN IN AM ICA (1962).
48. 378 U.S. at 261-62.
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The same question must be asked in the case of nonemployee
union organizers.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring in Bell, has interpreted
Marsh and Shelley to stand for the proposition that a state may
act improperly when it deprives individuals of their constitutional
rights through "inaction" as well as affirmative action. Inaction
is the same thing, according to Justice Goldberg, as a state statute
authorizing the racial discrimination practiced in these cases:
The decision of Maryland's highest court in sustaining these trespass
convictions cannot be described as "neutral," for the decision is as
affirmative in effect as if the State had enacted an unconstitutional law
explicitly authorizing racial discrimination in places of public accom-
modation. A State, obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to
maintain a system of law in which Negroes are not denied protection
in their claim to be treated as equal members of the community, may
not use its criminal trespass laws to frustrate the constitutionally
granted right. Nor, it should be added, may a State frustrate this right
by legitimating a proprietor's attempt at self-help.49
Thus Justice Goldberg has written - once again with the con-
currence of Justice Douglas - that Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is congressional legislation enacted pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment in order to delineate more precisely the
public-private dividing line.o
In Bell the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, with whom
Justices Harlan and White concur, presents an argument very
much at odds with Marsh. Both Marsh and Shelley are rational-
ized as cases where, "in reality" the authority exercised was iden-
tified with governmental functions. All of this is indeed curious
for, as we have seen, the Marsh majority had considerably more
to say and the author was none other than Justice Black. The
severe reversal of thinking that has taken place in the mind of
Justice Black is not difficult to see when one compares his "pre-
ferred position" analysis with the following quote in Bell:
[Pletitioners would have us say that [the owner] Hooper's federal right
must be cut down and he be compelled - though no statute said he
must-to allow people to force their way into his restaurant and
remain there over his protest. We cannot subscribe to such a mutilat-
ing, one-sided interpretation of federal guarantees, the very heart of
which is equal treatment under law to all. We must never' forget that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects "life, liberty, or property" of all
people generally, not just some people's "life," some people's "liberty,"
49. Id. at 811.
50. See the concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Goldberg in Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348, 369, 875 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 85 Sup. Ct. 877 (1964).
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and some kinds of "property."
[TV]e believe that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not bar Maryland from enforcing its trespass laws so long as it does
so with impartiality.5'
This opinion, then, is in stark contrast to the tone of Marsh. The
dissent is apparently bottomed upon the value of law and order
and the threat that trespass poses to it. But, as Justice Goldberg
points up by way of answer, this argument avoids the crucial
question: in whose favor is law and order to be established?"2
The business invitation is to the public at large and yet in Bell
the owner reneges on "impartiality" and as a consequence so does
the state. While the constitutional framework for the rights that
these sit-ins assert would appear to be favorable, it should be
noted at this point that the demands pressed by the unions will
diverge factually in two major respects.
First, the sit-ins are truly recipients of the business invitation.
They come to buy the product that the owner sells and thus ful-
fill the very purpose for which his property is open. Not so the
union organizer whose role as a customer may be only incidental
at best. Of course, to the extent that the sit-ins knew - as surely
most of them did - that they would not be served, they came
to protest the existing order. In this respect they are much like
the organizer. Indeed, the Douglas-Goldberg position finds this
aspect of the sit-ins' presence to be the core of constitutional
protection. So also does Mr. Justice Harlan - that is to say
where management gives its "implied consent" - in his dissent-
ing opinion in Garner.s
The second distinguishing characteristic of the union cause
is the commercial element of unionism. If "solicitation" is in-
volved, as the Board has defined it," a commercial transaction
is often contemplated. Though as a matter of practice many
unions defer the payment of dues and initiation fees," never-
theless the case for the union's exclusion seemingly is stronger to
51. 378 U.S. at 331-32, 342. (Emphasis added.)
52. Id. at 311-12; cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
53. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961).
54. In Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NL.R.B. 615 (1962), the Board
held that solicitation encompassed the distribution of union authorization
cards and was thus permissible at any location in the plant during nonwork-
ing time. Distribution of literature, on the other hand, can be conducted only
in nonworking areas during nonworking times because of the litter problem
and its threat to plant discipline and production.
55. See Note, Validity of Statutes and Ordinances Requiring Licensing
of Union Organizers, 70 HAnv. L. Ruv. 1271 (1957).
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the extent that authorization cards and consequent financial
obligations on the part of employees are present in the campaign.
These conclusions are the teachings of Supreme Court decisions
concerning both labor unions"8 and other matters." Of course it
should be added that the unions' other "disadvantage" - per-
suasion of the public rather than employees - will not normally
merge with the commercial element. When the union is concerned
with informing the public, conduct which consists of financial
solicitations is normally not involved. Thus the chance that both
legal disadvantages - the public and commercial solicitation -
would be raised in one case is improbable.
III. UNION USE OF MANAGEMENT PROPERTY IN THE
QUASI-PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
One of the greatest puzzles contained in the Babcock rationale
is its reliance on the ability of the unions to communicate with
employees at their homes. As Mr. Justice Douglas emphasizes in
Bell, the home is man's strongest refuge for privacy and property
rights. Moreover, Mr. Justice Reed, the author of Babcock, was
in other decisions" a guardian of statutes protecting the home
owner's privacy vis-a-vis door-to-door distribution of literature.
One wonders whether this state action, permissible or not, should
influence a judicial analysis of the "imbalance" of organizational
opportunities. In any event no one dissents from the idea that
considerations of state action and quasi-public property disappear
at a point something short of the individual's home. 9 One estab-
lished guideline, in terms of the NLRA, is that the union may
56. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945).
57. Of. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Compare Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), wit& Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943).
58. Breard v. Alexandria, supra note 57; Martin v. City of Struthers, supra
note 57.
59. But see NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th
Cir. 1948); Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1988 (1963) (employees
lived on company property adjoining plant making them inaccessible to
union organizers). On the question of permission vis-a-vis risking conviction
for trespass discussed in Bancroft, see Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 12 N.W.2d 785 (1963),
where the Michigan Supreme Court granted the petitioning union access
through a declaratory judgment. Query, would state inaction in this context
violate the fourteenth amendment? In this regard see 49 VA. L. REV. 1571
(1963). For a discussion of the obligation of a union to seek permission from
the property owner, see paragraph accompanying note 117 infra.
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not post union literature on the plant property itself.o Moreover,
in Bendix Corp." the Board held that even where an employer
had permitted employees to use equipment in the past, his refusal
to allow employees to use it for the reproduction of union litera-
ture was lawful. The employer's requirement that he control the
"use" of his own equipment was "a reasonable one." In both
cases the results reached are sensible. Property in each is of a
more personal nature; union use does not seem essential; and
there is a comparative risk of damage, in Bendix, to the property
in dispute.
A. SPEAKING HALLS
In Hague v. C1062 the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance
prohibiting, without a permit, assemblies in public buildings as
well as public streets, highways and parks." In NLRB v. Stowe
Spinning Co." the Court held that a company could be required
to afford the union access to the company owned hall for the
purpose of an organizational meeting. A hall is a considerably
more difficult type of property to reach than the enterprise itself;
it falls somewhere between the business and the employer's pri-
vate home. This consideration may have prompted the severe
caution exhibited by the Court in setting forth the problems pre-
sented as that of a "company-dominated North Carolina mill
town" and thus unlike "the vast metropolitan centers where a
number of halls are available within easy reach of prospective
union members." Undoubtedly, therefore, a much stronger argu-
ment can be made here than in Marsh for limiting the holding
to the company-town context.
Yet in the final analysis the Court's opinion seems to be
premised upon the disparate treatment accorded the union. The
cease and desist order requiring union access was framed condi-
tionally upon disparate treatment in the future; disparate, that
60. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 857 (7th Cir. 1956);
cf. Ralph Wells & Co., Nos. 38-CA-6, 38-RC-1, Trial Examiner's Decision
No. 495-64, Sept. 11, 1964.
61. 131 N.L.R.B. 599 (1961), enforced as modified, 299 F.2d 308 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 897 (1962).
62. 807 U.S. 496 (1939); cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418
(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State
(Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griflin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
63. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 98 (1949) (strong dissent of Black,
J.). But cf. id. at 77 (Court's and concurring opinions).
64. 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
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is to say, between the union and the remaining public to whom
an invitation was extended for the owner's financial benefit. As
the Court said:
In this case . . . the Board did not find that the very denial of the
ball was an unfair labor practice. It found that the refusal by these
respondents was unreasonable because the hall had been given freely to
others, and because no other halls were available for organization . . . .
What the Board found, and all we are considering here, is discrimina-
tion.o5
For another reason, unarticulated by the Court, discriminatory
intent must loom larger in this case. Here the employer is unable
to avail himself of the defenses which Republic provides - the
limitation of organizational rights insofar as they interfere with
production and discipline. In one sense the hall is difficult to
reach; its distance from the plant allows the employer to assert
his own constitutional right of privacy.66 But that same distance
eliminates the production and discipline defenses. One can con-
cede that Stowe presents a company-town situation without which
the Court might not have reached the question of discrimination.
Nevertheless, the importance that the hall played there points up
the analogy to be made to other public access enterprises which
have come to be regarded as elemental to the more common
community outside isolated rural areas.
In other contexts, property more directly related to the enter-
prise is the object of dispute. Despite the high values which the
Board placed on the speaking hall in Livingston Shirt Corp.,67
the hall does not contain significance in the organizational cam-
paign. Indeed in Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co.," where one was
available, the Board overrode other property considerations in
requiring union access to company owned homes leased by em-
ployees where their entry to and departure from the plant did
not take them off company property:
The Petitioner was not required to risk prosecution for trespass in
order to assert its right to organize. Quite properly it wrote to the
employer asking permission to enter upon company grounds in order
to conduct its organizing activities. As previously noted, the Employer
denied the request. Further, the fact relied on by the Regional Director
that the no-distribution-of-literature rule was applied to all distribu-
tions and not only to those involving union matters cannot curtail the
Petitioner's statutory rights. [Citing Republic] .. .9
65. Id. at 233.
66. See notes 57 & 58 supra.
67. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
68. 140 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1963); see note 59 supra.
69. 140 N.L.R.B. at 1291.
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B. STREETS AND THOROUGHFARES
In a number of cases"o the Board has upheld the right of
organizers to conduct their union activities on company owned
streets. In Marshall Field & Co.71 the Board held that employees
"uniquely handicapped" by department store no-solicitation rules
could have the benefit of nonemployee organizers on a company
owned, adjacent street available to the public, used occasionally
by both employees and customers. The Seventh Circuit, rejecting
the Board's handicap in communication theory, nevertheless held
that access here was properly required as "it does partake of the
nature of a city street, even though owned by the company . . . ."2
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, grounded its holding on either
public access or the governmental function theory; the imbalance
in communications emphasized in Babcock was not relied upon.
In General Dynamics/ Telecommunications73 a Board majority
consisting of Chairman McCulloch and Members Rodgers and
Leedom, made clear the limited scope to be given both Marshall
Field and Marsh through Board interpretation. In General Dy-
namics the company owned a "public thoroughfare" adjacent to
the plant which was used by the public. The incumbent union
employees were permitted to pass out handbills on the street
while similar rights were denied nonemployee organizers of the
charging party. The Board held that disparity of treatment" for
nonemployees and employees was lawful under Babcock and that
under the doctrine of that case the complaining union had ade-
quate channels of communication.
Applicability of the Marsh rationale, the Board admitted, was
not "without persuasive content."75 But the Board held that the
Babcock case governed and had thus limited Marsh to its com-
pany town factual context. Member Brown, dissenting, 6 pointed
out that Babcock concerned company property from which the
70. E.g., United Aircraft Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 594 (1946); Brown Ship-
building Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1047 (1946); cf. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 72
NL.R.B. 1321 (1947).
71. 98 NL.R.B. 88, enforced as modified, 200 F.Rd 375 (7th Cir. 1959).
72. 200 F.2d at 880.
73. 137 N.L R.B. 1725 (1962).
74. The employer was able to argue that there was no disparity between
treatment accorded nonemployee organizers and the rest of the public. Man-
agement prohibited all "commercial" solicitation by outsiders on the thorough-
fare. Thus it was asserted-and accepted by the Board majority-that no
discriminatory se of property was involved.
75. 137 NJL.R.B. at 1729.
76. Id. at 1730. Member Fanning did not participate in this case; Member
Jenkins was not appointed to the Board at this time.
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public was excluded and asserted that "the Board Members un-
duly extend the reach of the Babcock & Wilcox decision in apply-
ing it to the present facts."7 7 The dissent also argued that Marsh
could not turn on the availability of communications theory 8
promulgated in Babcock. The latter argument is undoubtedly
correct and becomes clear if one only traces Mr. Justice Reed's
dissent in Marsh and in other cases where he continually pro-
pounded the theory which the Court eventually accepted in
Babcock.70 Marsh could not in any event be structured on avail-
ability, as petitioner there could have distributed literature on
public property. Thus Member Brown's dissent, in terms of legal
analysis, is the better view.
Babcock did not undertake to overrule Marsh. As the General
Dynamics majority noted, 0o Babcock does not mention that case.
Indeed a plausible argument can be advanced for its consistency
with Stowe, and perhaps the Marsh case itself. This thesis pro-
ceeds upon the assumption that the above quoted portion of the
Babcock holding is to be read conjunctively to say that disparate
treatment or an imbalance in communications will permit the
organizers to override the trespass laws. Implicit in Member
Brown's General Dynamics dissent is the relative unrelated-to-
the-enterprise nature of the thoroughfare. In this case it is even
more difficult to exclude organizers, as was done in the Babcock
parking lot, as a threat to the law and order (production and dis-
cipline in the words of the Board) of the plant. In General Dy-
namics the enterprise is more distant from the property upon
which the union seeks to distribute literature. And surely these
above mentioned employer defenses remain relevant to non-
employee rights. Otherwise, why should "disparate" treatment
require management to open plant property to organizers?
Since employees were permitted to distribute in General Dy-
namics, both discrimination and public access were present. (Even
without the discrimination element the case comports with the
Seventh Circuit's public access analysis in Marshall Field. More-
over, there is nothing in Stowe to indicate that the employer may
discriminate against a union on the basis of the use to which
property is put. In the recent Supreme Court decision of Cox v.
Louisiana," both the majority opinion and Mr. Justice Black
in concurrence equated union picketing with racial protest demon-
77. Id. at 1781.
78. Id. at 1731 n.10.
79. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 513 (1946).
80. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1730 n.8.
81. 85 Sup. t. 453, 464-65, 468 (1965).
1965] 523
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
strations, which included marching, parades, and singing. Because
of the Government's past acquiescence in the former activity,
prohibition of the latter would be discriminatory, according to the
Court. Thus markedly different types of conduct or expression
do not, in themselves, justify a restraint.) The thoroughfare in
General Dynamics is not like the parking lot or other portions
of the plant which employees have a statutory right to use. If
anything, the employees' position in General Dynamics is more
analogous to use of the hall in Stowe. To the extent that nonem-
ployees and employees should be on a different footing, it would
be preferable to give the former precedence and preclude employee
rights on the alternate-channels-of-communications theory with
a reverse twist to the effect that these employee rights can be
exercised inside the plant pursuant to Republic, while nonem-
ployees cannot so operate.
Accordingly, Member Brown's dissent would have been more
persuasive if it had emphasized this discrimination element of the
case and placed more reliance upon Stowe. However, the above
mentioned Stowe dictum, differentiating that case from the metro-
politan area situation, may have deterred the use of an opinion
more vulnerable linguistically. Nevertheless, Babcock interprets
Stowe, as does this analysis, on the basis of discrimination and
not the company town. 2
Finally, General Dynamics could have been properly grounded
upon the public access theory alone. As noted above, both Marsh
and Marshall Field provide ample support in this regard.
C. RETAIL STORE PARKING LOTS
In S. Klein Dep't Stores, Inc." the Board adopted a trial
examiner's decision upholding the prohibition of union literature
distribution under the protection of Babcock & Wilcox, with-
out mention of the public access distinction. Here, of course, the
employer's legitimate business interest becomes stronger because
of potential interference with customer mobility and consequent
annoyances to the same group. But the Board chose to keep this
82. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 851 U.S. 105, 111 n.4 (1956); cf.
GEM Intl Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. 1348 (1962), enforcement denied, 821 F.2d 626
(8th Cir. 1963).
83. 149 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 57 L.R.R.M. 1321 (Nov. 5, 1964). Compare
GEM Int'l Inc., supra note 82, where a union organizer was prevented from
distributing material on the walk in front of a department store while organ-
izers of another union were afforded access. The Board found that this, along
with other employer conduct, violated § 8(a)(1) of the act.
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case within the rules established by Babcock and thus avoided
the very novel issues presented by (1) public access, and (2) dis-
ruption of the business relationship. Once again both Marsh and
Marshall Field point to a conclusion antithetical to that which
the Board reached.
An important state court decision involving retail parking lots
is People v. Goduto." In that case union representatives entered
the parking lot used by both customers and employees for the
"sole purpose" of distributing union leaflets and questionnaires to
employees at the store. Though the main thrust of the opinion is
directed at the question whether the state was precluded from
asserting jurisdiction here by the doctrine of preemption - a
problem to be discussed below - the Illinois Supreme Court indi-
cated that in its view Babcock controlled the questions raised in
Goduto:
In these circumstances the court recognizes the property interest of the
employer to be superior to the interest of the union in having a con-
venient means of communicating with employees. The notice or order
of the employer is of little consequence, however, if it cannot be
enforced.85
The retail establishment may, as in Garner and Bell, lend it-
self to the exercise of union activities. 6 However, as noted above,
the potential disruption of the customer-employee relationship
will normally outweigh union rights in public areas inside the
establishment. In such situations the Board, by divided vote, has
even refused to uphold the employee's right to talk to nonem-
84. 21 Ill. ed 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961). It
should be pointed out that the Supreme Court has specifically reserved the
question of conflict posed by union organizational rights and local trespass
statutes and ordinances, in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats
Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
85. 21 Ill. 2d at 610, 174 N.E.Qd at 388.
86. See also Hood v. Stafford, 378 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn. 1964), wherein the
Tennessee Supreme Court upheld an injunction against picketing on a retail
parking lot by a nonemployee, which injunction was issued pursuant to a
city ordinance which made it "unlawful for any person to entice or attempt
to entice away from any business house anyone trading therein . . . , or to
enter into any business house, or stand on the street or sidewalk in front of
any business house, for the purpose of enticing anyone therefrom." Id. at 767.
The Tennessee court's ruling appears to be erroneous for at least two reasons:
(1) the breadth of the ordinance. See NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58
(1964). (2) lack of jurisdiction due to the preemption doctrine-both Babcock
and § 8(b)(7), which regulates this type of picketing, support this conclusion.
Indeed, in Hood, the Board actually had jurisdiction to issue the injunction
in the form of a contested representation election. Cf. Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S.
80 (1964).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:505
ployee organizers." On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has held
that employees in a retail supermarket have the right to talk
among themselves during working time so as to obtain informa-
tion necessary to the conduct of future union meetings." In the
supermarket it would seem that the public access concept,
coupled with a less direct customer-employee relationship than
prevails in department stores, should argue for the presence of
organizers on company property for some portion of the em-
ployee's work shift.
D. SHOPPING CENTERS
As to union picketing on a privately owned shopping center, the
California Supreme Court had this to say in Schwartz-Torrance
Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers:
... [Tihe countervailing interest which plaintiff endeavors to vindicate
emanates from the exclusive possession and enjoyment of private prop-
erty. Because of the public character of the shopping center, however,
the impairment of plaintiffs interest must be largely theoretical. Plain-
tiff has fully opened his property to the public.. . . The shopping cen-
ter affords unrestricted access between its parking lot and the public
streets. The center constitutes a conglomeration of business enterprises
designed to provide essential services to all members of the local
community....
We conclude that the picketing in the present case cannot be ad-
judged in the terms of absolute property rights; it must be considered
as part of the law of labor relations, and a balance cast between the
opposing interests of the union and the lessor of the shopping center.
The prohibition of the picketing would in substance deprive the union
of the opportunity to conduct its picketing at the most effective point
of persuasion: the place of the involved business. The interest of the
union thus rests upon the solid substance of public policy and constitu-
tional right; the interest of the plaintiff lies in the shadow cast by a
property right worn thin by public usage.89
The California Supreme Court sensibly analyzes a number of
factors peculiar to the shopping center and the debate between
union and property rights. The first is that property rights in this
87. See Meier & Frank Co., 89 NL.R.B. 1016 (1950), on the right of de-
partment store employees to talk to union organizers on company property.
See especially the dissenting opinion of Members Houston and Styles, id. at
1022; of. Flambeau Plastics Corp., 151 NL.R.B. No. 70, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (58
L.R.R.M.) - (March 16, 1965); Lexington Chain Co., 150 NL.R.B. No.
126, 2 LAn. REL. REP. (58 L.R.R.M.) 1263 (Jan. 28, 1965).
88. NLRB v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1960).
89. 394 P.2d 921, 924, 926, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233, 286, 238 (1964), cert. denied,
33 U.SL. WEEK 3283 (U.S. March 2, 1965). As pointed out in note 84 supra,
the Supreme Court has specifically reserved this question.
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context must be viewed as a part of labor relations laws. This
view is quite similar to the views expressed in Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in Marsh. The property right must be
considered on its merits and not as a clarion call slogan designed
to promote emotive reaction. Thus the employer's legitimate
property interest in his right to make, for instance, advertising
decisions can be rationalized as quite relevant to the firm's suc-
cess. Here the court is correct in stating that the owner can suffer
no "significant harm" through this limitation of a property right.
If the owner can demonstrate probable or actual interference
with the company's business success or- to relate back to Re-
public - its production and discipline, adjustments should be
made. Such adjustments are discussed below.
The second factor peculiar to the shopping center is its "ele-
mental" nature, the conglomeration of business interests present,
to paraphrase the court, and the extreme dependence which the
community must place upon it. Whether the union activity is
solicitation, distribution, or picketing, it is important to bring
focus upon a particular establishment. Both customers and em-
ployees would be difficult to reach at the common entrances
through which everyone must proceed. A public sidewalk would
normally suffice if the establishment were not located in such a
center. Thus the utilization of private property becomes im-
portant.
Schwartz-Torrance also seeks to distinguish Babcock, as has
been done here, on the ground that the parking lot in the latter
case was not open to the public. Thus the court is able to conclude
in Schwartz-Torrance that, in effect, the property in question is
quasi-public and that as in Marsh, the owner's right is a "diluted"
one. Fortunately the court does not seek to justify this conclu-
sion on the basis of a "permissive use" or dedication to the public.
In Breard v. Alexandria"0 the Supreme Court, referring to
Marsh and a companion case, said that "in neither case was there
dedication to public use but it seems fair to say that the permis-
sive use of the ways was considered equal to such dedication.""
Most certainly no dedication, in this sense of the word, is found
in Stowe. This concept of "permissive use" would seem applicable
to shopping centers if viewed as analogous to a "public street
or walk" which, although private property, is more accessible to
the general public.9 2 This is how the Michigan Supreme Court
analyzed the problem in Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Won-
90. 841 U.S. 622 (1951).
91. Id. at 648.
92. See note 88 supra.
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derland Shopping Center, Inc.,." affirming, by virtue of a tie vote,
a trial judge's characterization of shopping center property as
quasi-public. In this case the Michigan Supreme Court,"4 without
utilizing the Breard rationale, said that the "dedicated use" was
that of a "modern public market place" in which the public's
right to free speech (in this case union handbilling to the public)
could not be denied. Here again, as in Stowe, there is an indica-
tion that a major, if not crucial, element in the holding exists in
the "arbitrary" and discriminatory power to select who shall and
shall not exercise their rights."
However, it is dangerous to justify quasi-public use or "per-
missive use" in terms of dedication, as was done by the Michigan
court.9 6 This view must require the rather artificial conclusion
that the owner is inviting an individual onto private property
so that the customer can exercise free speech rights - especially
such speech as protests the owner's own policies, be they segrega-
tion or anti-unionism, rather than "neutral" matter not directly
related to him. The law will appear foolish if it implies such a
dedication, for it is clear to anyone that the owner's motivations
are purely those of business. To the extent that handbilling is
tolerated or welcomed, one must view such a concession in the
same light. Surely goodwill for the business is the basic considera-
tion. Clearly under this approach union organizers will be excluded
even where other groups are allowed to conduct their activity in
the shopping center. It will be a rare property owner that en-
visages a union advertisement of a dispute with one of his lessees
- upon whose profits he depends - as in his business interest.
The same may be said of the lessee who operates the shopping
center establishment itself.9 7 If the law is to interpret this union
activity as within dedication's penumbra, we should understand
93. 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963).
94. Strictly speaking there is no majority or dissenting opinion because
of a tie vote, but reference to the concurring opinion of Justices Black and
Smith is equated with a majority opinion since the vote's effect is to affirm
the trial judge's opinion.
95. The court noted that the property owner's power to exclude was
"undesirable not by law but by the arbitrary decision of the property owner
." 370 Mich. at 570, 12 N.W.ed at 797. (Emphasis added.)
96. Id. at 565, 122 N.W.2d at 795.
97. Tn Nahas v. Local 905, Retail Clerks Ass'n, 144 Cal. App. ed 808, 301
P.d 932 (1956), a distinction between the right of an employer-tenant and
that of the property owner to enjoin union conduct was employed. This dis-
tinction has been discussed in Note, 10 STAw. L. REV. 694 (1958); 73 HARv.
L. REv. 1216 (1960). In Schwartz-Torrance, the California Supreme Court
rejected the Nahas holding on this point.
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that legal interpretation has been stretched to its outer limits.
Thus, the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Carr is able to score
a very sound point on the Wonderland majority in emphasizing
the property's business purpose." The concept of "permissive use"
as enunciated in Breard is somewhat preferable from the stand-
point of reality.
Contrary to California and Michigan, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court refrained from protecting union picketing" on a privately
owned sidewalk in front of a shopping center establishment. The
court indicated an interest in the physical characteristics of the
center, to a precise degree, so as to establish guidelines for future
litigants. Thus the case was dismissed for lack of evidence. At
the same time the court said:
[IJf the record before us clearly established that the property involved
is a multistore shopping center, with sidewalks simulated so as to ap-
pear to he public in nature, we would have no difficulty in reaching
a conclusion that the shopping-center owner must yield to the rights
of freedom of speech and communication which attend peaceful
picketing. 00
The curious aspect of the decision consists in its apparent will-
ingness to view activity on the sidewalk as more of an encroach-
ment on property rights than activity in, perhaps, the parking
lot. However, the converse is considerably more likely. 'Union
activity in the parking lot can disrupt a function necessary to
the employer's business. There is no comparable function on the
sidewalk. Moreover, activity on the sidewalk more clearly relates
to and identifies the employer involved. Consequently it would
seem that the court has its priorities confused. Here the geo-
graphical location places the activity in question on a plane
superior to all others. To envisage anything but a quasi-public
use for a sidewalk on which the customer is invited to tread be-
fore entering the store is difficult. But possibly an employer de-
sirous of avoiding adverse publicity might find the parking lot
a preferable location for union activities. In the shopping center
the business interference is directed at everyone; the sympathy
of other employers engendered by irritations accorded their cus-
tomers might enlist them as allies and increase his economic
resistance to the union. This situation is a good example of the
divergence that may often appear between what management
98. 370 Mich. at 553, 561-62, 122 N.W.2d at 788-89, 793.
99. Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d
876 (1962).
100. Id. at 505, 114 N.W.2d at 879.
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sees as its business interests and the legitimate protection which
the law affords.
In Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union'0 the Washington Supreme
Court held that the question of trespass and union picketing in
a shopping center was preempted by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act and that that court was without jurisdiction. Most
important is the concurring opinion which accepted jurisdiction,
and adopted the trial judge's five criteria for deciding such cases.
The trial judge said that free speech rights could be exercised on
private property when all or some of the following factors are
present: (1) when the owner designs property for use by the
general public in a manner so as to make it difficult or impossible
to distinguish its physical characteristics from public property
similarly so devoted; (2) the free speech in question is for the
purpose of communication with people naturally upon the prem-
ises as a result "of the primary use to which the property is de-
voted"; (3) the communication would have been permitted if
the property were public; (4) "interference with the owner's fun-
damental rights of privacy or personal use and occupancy is not
involved as distinguished from control, and no direct pecuniary
loss will result to the owner"; and (5) no alternate routes of com-
munication as effective as the disputed one exists.'02 The last
mentioned criterion directly challenges the Babcock rationale.
However, the very nature of the center - a focal point for the
whole community - and the fact that employees may be more
likely to have homes which are most distant from this or any
other one center argue for the presumption that there are no
alternate means of communication.
Curiously the Board has never decided a case dealing with
nonemployee organizers and their right to campaign in the shop-
ping center. If the Board were to adopt the "unrelated to the
enterprise" analysis advanced here in connection with the thor-
oughfare in General Dynamics and the hall in Stowe, union rights
on shopping centers might prove to be tenuous. For clearly the
shopping center is comparatively closely related to the enterprise.
Functionally, this close relation exists for the parking lot; geo-
graphically, the same applies to the sidewalk. One can appreciate
the brevity and general approach of Member Brown's dissent
in General Dynamics if such were motivated by a concern to
avoid this dilemma. Yet here it is possible to overcome such
problems and the Babcock criteria, by directing attention to the
101. 58 Wash. 2d 426, 868 P.2d 803 (1961).
102. Id. at 432, 868 P.2d at 806.
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existence of the owner's economic invitation. Once again, the
public is not excluded from the area, but rather the area seeks
out nonemployees. Arguably the economic invitation makes the
shopping center situation a comparably stronger case for the
union - especially because of the greater amount of time that
the entire public, including the employees, spend there. The na-
ture of the enterprise - stores for all the customers' needs -
compels this type of use.
On the other hand, the argument on behalf of union rights in
shopping centers has drawbacks. It is of course possible for the
Board to find Babcock inapplicable on quasi-public grounds. Nev-
ertheless, such a holding would highlight the very large extension
grafted onto the solicitation case law. Although a possible by-
product in those cases, even General Dynamics and Stowe do not
reach the question of informing the public at large about a labor
dispute. We have already noted the demonstrated hostility against
such conduct. If a labor union could convince the Board that
its activity is aimed solely or even primarily, at employers and not
customers, it would be easier to decide in favor of the union. Of
course, the answer to this factual question may not always be
discernible.
Public handbilling would present squarely the Marsh issues
and could well take the Board beyond that case because of the
activity's potential and intentional impact on the owner. Unless
the owner operates a religious institution, religious literature such
as distributed in Marsh cannot invoke a comparable analysis.
The petitioner in Marsh probably had no dispute as such with
the objecting management.
The course that shopping center owners might follow is that
of prohibiting handbilling of any kind in order to avoid the charge
of discrimination, thereby avoiding the snares set by Babcock's
prohibition of disparate treatment. A court might be less willing
to accuse the owner, as in Wonderland, of arbitrary action insofar
as union activity is concerned. Here one must obtain guidelines
from Marsh, for in that case discrimination was not considered
by the Court. If we analogize the contemporary shopping center
to Marsh's business district, the question will begin to answer
itself.
Clearly the owner's exclusion of religious literature could not
stand. Consequently, the last hurdle under the assumption of a
proper analogy is an equation of union literature and religious
literature. Thomas v. Collins= indicates that the equation, in-
103. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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sofar as it is devoid of commercial transactions, must be made.
It is unlikely that this qualification would be pertinent to a shop-
ping center case involving the public. As stated above, it is
improbable that both legal disadvantages - a) the public and
b) commercial solicitation - would be raised in one case.
But the argument could be made that the owner's business
losses are analogous to the potential harm to the community
inherent in commercial activity. In both instances the state seeks
to protect people against unnecessary economic losses. This reason-
ing, then, would make the crucial question turn on whether the
shopping center owner's losses can be viewed as potential injury
to the community in this context. The merit in this proposition,
if any, derives from the concept which is urged to support union
rights. If the shopping center is a necessary element of existence
for the community, the owner will say that the economic harm
done to it is a harm to the public as a whole. It is submitted that
this proposition should fail because of the constitutional and
statutory support - mentioned above - for some form of limita-
tion on property rights.
The Board, if it adheres to General Dynamics, should distin-
guish that case from the shopping center situation, because of
the latter's economic importance, and thus hold that section 7
grants nonemployee organizers some rights of this type on private
property. This view would, of course, lead to a reexamination
and retreat from the Board's Marsh analysis. However, the bene-
fits to be gained by such a retreat outweigh the implications of
a confession of error. The shopping center continues to play a
central role in American suburban life. The balancing of interests
should give preference to section 7 and the first amendment. 04
IV. JURISDICTION: NLRB AND THE STATE JUDICIARY
Decisions by both the Board and state courts in this area
pose the issue of preemption - the question of when the fed-
eral government dominates or regulates a particular subject
matter so as to exclude state jurisdiction. In San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon'05 the Supreme Court held that "when
an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States
as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive compe-
tence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of
104. Such balancing should be equally applicable, for constitutional pur-
poses, to state inaction present in Wonderland. See note 59 supra.
105. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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state interference with national policy is to be averted." 06 As far
reaching as the "arguably" concept is, Garmon also preserves
traditional state jurisdiction in cases where violence and threats
to the public order are present. The difficulty here arises out of
the ejection of union organizers from company property by state
police and courts pursuant to local trespass laws. The issue was
squarely presented in People v. Goduto1oT
In Goduto the Illinois Supreme Court adjudged the rights of
union organizers on a department store parking lot open to both
employees and customers. The employer had informed the organ-
izers that no such activity could be conducted without company
permission. Nevertheless the organizers refused to leave, declar-
ing that they had a legal right to be where they were. The court
held that their subsequent arrest and conviction was proper under
Garmon as "when a person refuses to leave ... after he has been
ordered to do so, a threat of violence becomes imminent."s08 The
court reasoned that if the State had not intervened, the company
would have had no recourse but self-help. Thus there was a dan-
ger of violence. But the court examined at further length Gar-
mon's explicit acceptance of primary jurisdiction, and noted the
careful scrutiny to which state court records are subjected as to
a finding of actual violence. The inexact standards of Babcock
and the failure of the union to utilize Board processes permitted,
in the court's opinion, avoidance of this very difficult point.
Implicit in Goduto is the assumption that the employer, on
the basis of a promanagement legal analysis, will always seek to
remove organizers from his property. Babcock may well encour-
age the judiciary to assist the employer in his interpretation.
However, a failure to utilize Board processes does not provide
the answer to Goduto. The same analysis could properly apply
to an employee wrongfully discharged for protected activity.
Moreover, one might ask why the organizer must risk state prose-
cution because the Board does not entertain petitions for declara-
tory judgments and advisory opinions of this sort.
Nevertheless it is possible to appreciate the Illinois court's
conclusion, limited as it is by the framework of existing federal
law. A significant distinction exists between employees and non-
employees insofar as this case is concerned. This is the control
that the employer is able to exercise in regard to either group.
In Goduto the employer is relatively helpless. The employer can-
106. Id. at 245.
107. 21 Il. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
108. Id. at 609, 174 N.E.2d at 387.
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not trigger a section 8(a)(3) proceeding through discharge, as
would be the case with employees and, more important, manage-
ment requests will be without force of authority. Yet, as stated
above, one of the best reasons for concurrence with the Illinois
court is the vagueness of federal law. The employer's concern
with noncustomers moving around on his property and the con-
sequent risk of liability in regard to other invitees strengthens
the court's position.
A way out of the Goduto dilemma would be articulated if the
Board should clarify the principles applicable to nonemployees on
public access property, such as in Goduto, without unnecessary
qualifications. One qualification, to be discussed below, might
buttress further the result reached in Goduto. On the other hand,
a post Goduto development points up legal recourse for the em-
ployer under Board auspices rather than those of the states.
It is accepted that nonemployee conduct on company property
that is tinged with violence is unlawful under section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the act. 09 The Supreme Court has held that that provision
does not extend to peaceful activity like picketing, as the Board
once contended, but rather is restricted to "rough stuff" or vio-
lence. 10 However, the Court has limited that approach in Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB,1xx in which the
nonviolent execution of a contract between an employer and a
minority union was held to violate that provision of the law. The
Board has since made it clear in General Motors Corp.12 that
ILGW may be an impetus to application of section 8(b)(1)(A)
to the Goduto type case. In General Motors the Board held that
the union as well as the employer violated the act by maintaining
in effect a contract restricting the solicitation rights of employees.
The holding makes it arguable that the employer (or an employee,
for that matter) in Goduto could obtain relief from the Board
in certain fact situations.
The record of other state courts in this area is not encouraging.
The Michigan Supreme Court, for instance, adopted the trial
judge's notion that preemption difficulties in Wonderland were
overcome through lack of a "labor dispute." In addition to Bab-
cock, the union's dispute with this secondary employer would
109. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1958): "It shall be an
unfair -labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (1) to restrain
or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7
... ." Of. National Organization Masters, 116 NL.R.B. 1787 (1956).
110. NLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
111. S66 U.S. 731 (1961).
112. 147 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 56 L.R.R.M. 1241 (June 18, 1964).
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lead to secondary-boycott and publicity-proviso problems posed
in section 8(b) (4).xxa The court did not discuss these problems.
The Washington Supreme Court held, without touching on
Babcock, that both handbilling and picketing are "arguably"
subject to section 8(b) provisions. The picketing in the California
Supreme Court case of Schwartz-Torrance seems ideally suited,
if one accepts the Garmon analysis, to Board processes under
section 8(b) (7), which concerns organizational and recognition
picketing. Yet the court bypassed the important jurisdiction ques-
tion in its haste to rule on the free speech issue.
CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction - where NLRB interstate commerce standards
are met'14 - should be in the hands of the Board. The Board,
entrusted with this great responsibility, should undertake revi-
sion of the rules of Babcock where public access property is in-
volved. This view does not intend to depreciate the role that
state courts are obligated to pursue in cases involving violence.
This responsibility remains regardless of whether the union or
the owner is entitled to preference. As Mr. Justice Goldberg has
said, the question is not law and order. The question is who is to
be restrained in order to obtain it. This author ventures the guess
that once the law is more certain in labor-management relations
- as it is becoming in civil rights - violence and consequent state
interference will diminish.
It should be emphasized that the Board decisions need not
touch upon the constitutional issues involved. The Douglas-
Goldberg rationale is not a prerequisite here because the Board
is interpreting 'a statute, section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. No ad-
judication is made in the absence of a statute; thus the basic
constitutional issue need not be confronted. Presumably this fact
will increase the chances of acceptance by Supreme Court Jus-
tices who might not accept the entire Douglas-Goldberg approach.
This is not to say, of course, that the approach is without rele-
vance and persuasiveness. This article has shown it to contain
both attributes.
At least equally promising in this context is the freedom of
association established by the Court in NAACP v. Alabaman"
113. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (Supp. V, 1964).
114. The states may assume jurisdiction where the Board's interstate
commerce requirements are not met. See Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, & 701(a), 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (Supp. V,
1964).
115. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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and applied to private property by the Board in May Dep't
Stores Co? . The potential benefit of this doctrine to employees
is the crux of the union case. Moreover, the negligible property
interest involved would hardly seem to detract from the free
speech protection asserted in picketing. However, in this writer's
opinion freedom of association occupies a slightly less vulnerable
position.
At the same time, management has legitimate business inter-
ests which qualify the utilization of these new found rights. The
law should obligate organizers to request permission to come onto
the property in question. While this formal step should hardly be
applicable to employees seeking to exercise their rights - though
the Supreme Court's Steelworkers decision holds to the contrary" 7
- the employer can rightfully be concerned with possible damage
to the property or liability incurred as a result of the nonem-
ployee strangers' presence. On the same theory, the owner should
properly be allowed to insist on identification of the organizer -
a kind of licensing. Certainly the union suffers no undue hardship,
for their campaign is completely exposed at this point in any
event.
Another proper limitation relates to the time during which
organizers may be present. In regard to employee-oriented solici-
tation and distribution, a good case can be made for prohibiting
union access during the rush hours so long as employees' work
schedules do not converge to any large degree. A reasonable
limitation seemingly could be made even where the union at-
tempts to reach the public. The latter might be dependent upon
economic injury to the employer that is demonstrably attributable
to union conduct on private property. For, as the Court has said
within the context of rights petitioned for on streets and side-
walks, "the rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental
in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with
opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public
place and at any time.""s
116. 186 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enforcement denied, 816 F.d 797 (6th
Cir. 1968).
117. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 857, 868 (1958). See also
Gimbel Bros., 147 NL.R.B. No. 62, 56 L.R.R.M. 1287 (June 17, 1964); James
Hotel Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 761 (1963). Compare Edmont Mfg., 189 N.L.R.B.
1528 (1962); Mayrath Co., 182 NL.R.B. 1628 (1961), enforcement granted,
319 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1968) (employer must inform employees why he re-
quests them to remove union insignia).
118. Cox v. Louisiana, 85 Sup. Ct. 453, 464 (1965); of. Kovacs v. Cooper,
836 U.S. 77 (1949). Regarding union loud speakers in public areas, the Court
said in Kovacs: "The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be
offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. In his home
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Moreover, the Board should limit the time during which cam-
paigning is to take place to a reasonable time before a Board con-
ducted election. Perhaps two months would be satisfactory. There
is no reason why a union which loses the election should be en-
titled to engage in the same conduct until two months before a
new election can be held." Surely the property owner should not
be subjected to undue harassment.
Furthermore, the property owner should be permitted reason-
able restrictions in regard to the location of organizers. If pri-
vately owned sidewalks are available in the shopping center, for
instance, it might be permissible to prohibit access to the parking
lot where potential for disruption is greater. On the other hand,
retail department stores or supermarket establishments would
not have this alternate communications defense. But presumably
where such establishments have parking areas on which the
presence of organizers would pose particular hazards - such as
those which place automobiles on several floors - the employer
would be justified in carefully restricting mobility. All of these
problems will require the Board's expertise in balancing and ad-
justing the various factors.
Finally of course, the application of the quasi-public analysis
to different enterprises is of the utmost importance. It simply
will not do to confuse the out worn "public interest" concept re-
lied upon by Mr. Justice Douglas in Garner and Bell to make
quasi-public synonymous with those industries which perform
governmental functions - whatever they may be. For our pur-
poses the same access rights applied to such establishments, de-
spite their public utility nature, would raise new and troublesome
problems in regard to the owner's legitimate business protection.
Bridges are a good example in this regard. Moreover, the steel
industry, for instance, is one which vitally affects the public inter-
est. But does this have any relevance to the issues discussed here?
This writer thinks not.
The really frightening aspect of the Douglas-Goldberg ap-
proach in this regard is the unnecessary judicial involvement in
economic analysis. Mr. Justice Douglas is undoubtedly correct in
taking judicial notice of the modern separation of ownership and
or on the street he is practically helpless to escape this interference with his
privacy by loud speakers . . . ." Id. at 86-87. (Footnote omitted.)
119. See National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3), amended by 61 Stat.
144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1964), which prohibits
a new election during the 12-month period after a "valid election" has been
held. Thus in Hood v. Stafford, 378 S.W.2d 766 (Tenn. 1964), where the union
lost a Board conducted election overwhelmingly and contested the election,
the union's case should be without merit but for the continued litigation.
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control and its implications for the assertion of property rights.
But the attempt to rationalize these cases in terms of industries
with governmental functions is ill-founded. Too great an exper-
tise is required in observing an ever changing economy. Possibly
the judicial incorporation of the economic philosophy that Mr.
Justice Holmes so eloquently warned us to abandon would be
resurrected.o20 For this reason the NLRB's solicitation law -
with its sound balancing of the business interest - is the best
framework through which this problem should be met.
120. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1918) (dissenting
opinion).
